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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
A.\~IE

M. CARPENTER,
Appellant,
-vs-

I

RUBY SYRETT,

Respondent.

\

Respondent's Brief
STATEMENT OF CASE
This action was commenced by the appellant against
the respondent to recover damages for personal injuries
sustained by appellant resulting from a fall down the
stairway leading from the second story to the ground
floor of the building owned and operated by respondent,
known as Ruby's Inn, which is located about four miles
north of Bryce Canyon in Garfield County, State of

Utah.
The mn is a two story building with a stairway
leading from the lobby to the second floor. The stairs
leading from the lobby go north for a few steps, then
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run east to the landing on the second floor, there being
more steps from the landing to the top than from the
lobby to the landing. The hall at the top of the stairs is
approximately four feet in width and there are rooms
along this hallway on either side at the t9p of the stairs.
The stairs enter the hallway at right angles near the
north end of the hall. The hall is so contructed that
natural light lights the hall from a glass door on the
north end of the hall and from a glass panel in the
door in the south end of the hall, also what light comes
into the hall from the rooms along the side of the hall.
The stairs from the bottom to the top of the first story
are lighted by natural light from the lobby of the inn.
The electric lights were turned out part of the time during
the day because they were not necessary, but when the
electric lights were out in the daytime there was sufficient light on the stairs for a person to go up and
down the stairs and the steps could be seen at such
time.
From the 21st to the 25th day of August, 1937, the
appellant was a registered guest at said inn. On the
25th day of August, 1937, at about 8:30 A. M. appellant
left her room on the second floor and walked along the
hall in a northerly direction to the stairs. When the
plaintiff started down the stairs she fell and sustained

. . .

severe InJUries.
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5
"fhe appellant had been ill and 1·e1nained in bed
the entire day and night prior to the accident
on
the morning of the accident she ,~;ent to the head of
the stairs and started do"?n "?ithout stopping or looking.

aoo

The appellant had never noticed the lighting in the
hall or ~tairs and on the morning in question she did
not see any electric lights burning in the hall.
The appellant's claim for damages against the
respondent is based "-holly on the theory that the respondent negligently caused or let the light go out .
thereby causing the appellant to fall and sustain the
injuries complained of. The respondent maintained that
there was no evidence of negligence in the maintenance
and operation of the electric lighting system, nor that
appellant's injury was in any way a result of respondent's negligence, and that there was no showing that
electric lights were necessary at the time of the accident.
The respondent also contends that the appellant was
guilty of contributory negligence.

ARGUMENT
The respondent contends that the court was under
a duty to grant the defendant's motion for a non-suit for
three reasons:
1. The appellant has failed to show that the defe~dant was under any duty to maintain electric lights
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in the hall or on the stairs at the time the injuries were
sustained by the plaintiff.
2. The appellant has failed to show or prove any
causal connection between the injuries suffered and the
negligence of the plaintiff.
3. The appellant was guilty of contributory negli-

gence.

PROPOSITION NUMBER ONE:
The respondent was not under any duty to main..
tain electric lights on the stairs or in the hall at the
time the appellant fell and suffered the injuries complained of.
An innkeeper is not an insurer of the safety of his
guests, but must exercise reasonable care for their safety,
comfort, and entertainment.
Quinn vs. Utah Gas and Coke Co., 42 Utah 113,
129 Pac. 362.
32 C.

J.

561, Sec. 69.

Baker et al, vs. Dallas Hotel Company, 73 Fed.
2nd. 825.
DeHoney vs. Harding, 300 Fed. 696.
Applying that rule, let us consider the evidence with
respect to the respondent's duty to maintain electric
lights at the time of the appellant's fall.
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L. C'arpenter. a "·itness for the plaintiff, and
incidentally a SlHl of the appellant, and a discharged
employee of the respondent testified in regard to the
condition of the light in the hall and on the stairs as
follo,,~s:
That the stairs "·ere dark without the use of
artificial lig-ht, but that in the daytime he ascended and
descended the stairs ''?ithout difficulty and that he could
see where he ,,-as going. (Tr. 58, ~\h. 16) and that there
were doors "-ith glass panels at the north and the south
end of the hall (Tr. 55~ A.b. 14) that the lights from the
lobby were sufficient· to light the lower part of the
stairs, and that there was nothing to obstruct this light
up to the second floor level, thus leaving the stairs
lighted by natural light from the lobby of the inn· with
the exception of those steps lying in the shadow of the
floor of the second story. {Tr. 59, 60, Ab. 16)
Maihen Johnson~ a witness for the appellant and
the former mechanic in charge of the lighting system
testified as follows in regard to the condition of the
lighting on the stairs.
Q.

''rere you on those stairs when there were no
electric lights on?

A.

Yes sir.

Q.

What was the condition of the light at that
time?

A.

Well the light from the top down as near as
I can remember is better than the light from
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. the bottom up, for the reason that the light
from the lobby shows in from the bottom,
and coming up the shadow of your person
naturally abstracts some of the light, but I
have gone up there as fast as I could walk
and go down and there wasn't any light.

Q.

And were you there when the electric lights
were not on?

A.

Yes sir.

Q.

What could you see in the way of visibility
when the electric lights were not on, on the
stairs?

A.

I could distinctly see every step from the top
down without any difficulty. (Tr. 79, 80,
81, Ab. 24, 25.)

He also testified that the lights were turned out
In the daytime when they were not necessary to run
appliances. (Tr. 82, Ab. 25.)
The evidence as above referred to shows that the
stairs were sufficiently well lighted by means of natural
light to eliminate any necessity or duty on the part of
the respondent to maintain electric lights at the time of
the accident for the following reasons:

1. The hall was lighted from both ends by reason
of glass doo~s in either end. There was a sufficient
amount of natural light coming from the glass ~oors at
each end of the hall to adequately light the hall.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9

) The stairs "Tere lighted 'vith light emi.nating from
the lobby. to such an extent that each step was clearly
visible.
3. That the stairs were so , ..Tell lighted by natural
light that it , ..~as not necessary to have the artificial lights
on in the daytime.

The trial court, therefore, acted propertly in granting the non-suit upon this point for the reason that the
appellant failed to show that the respondent was under
any duty to maintain electric lights on the stairs at the
time of the accident. but on the contrary, the appellant
has affirmatively shown that he was not under a duty
to maintain electric lights at such time and place.

PROPOSITIO:X i\'UMBER TWO:
The appellant has failed to show or prove any causal
connection between the injuries suffered and the negligence of the plaintiff.
In an action for damages for negligence
where the evidence entirely fails to connect the
negligence with the fact of the accident, the
court, should direct the jury that the plaintiff
cannot recover.
Thompson on Trials-Vol. 2, 2nd Edition, Page 1257, Sec.
1678.

In the case of Goater vs. Klotz, a Pennsylvania case,
reported at 124 Atl. 83, the court held as follows:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to
"1,he court cannot take a case from the jury,
as a matter of law, on the ground that no proper
finding can he reached, unless the evidence is so
conflicting that any verdict would he a mere
guess, hut where the burden is on plaintiff to
establish certain facts, and his testimony is so
contradictory as to present no basis for a finding,
except as a mere conjecture, a non-suit is properly
entered."
In the case of Quinn vs. the Utah Gas and Coke
Company, reported in 42 Utah 113, 129 Pac. 362, and on
page 119 of that case the court stated as follows:
"When a plaintiff produces evidence that is
consistent with an hypothesis that the defendant
is not negligent, and also with one that he is,
his proof tends to show neither."
The appellant, in the case at bar, has completely
failed to show any causal connection between the respondent's negligence operation of the light plant and
the injuries sustained by the appellant.
The appellant did not produce any direct evidence
that the lights went out before or at the time of her
fall, or that there were even any electric lights on in
the hall or stairs at the time she started down the stairs.
Let us consider the evidence of the appellant with
r~spect

to this proposition. Mrs. Carpenter, the appellant,

testified as follows: "The lights went out and everything
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",.as befuddled:· _-\s shown fron1 her testimony, (Tr.
118, ~'-h. 40) she had no idea "'hatsoever as to the light-

ing condition either before or after the accident. We
quote her testimony as follows from page 118 of the
transcript:

Q.

But you did not see any globes burning any
place did you?

~-\..

I don't remember.

Q.

But you saw the hall was lighted?

A..

Yes sir.

Q.

But you do not know where it came from?

A.

No sir.

Q.

Then so far as you know, it could have been
coming from the sun's ray~?

A.

There might have been some light from the
sun.

Q.

You haven't been there when one door was
open?

A.

I do not know.

Q.

Is it possible for one door to have been open
and lighted the hall?

A.

It might have been.
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The appellant also testified, "That she was ill and remained in her bed the entire day and night prior to the
accident," (Tr. 100, Ab. 32) "and she does not remember
whether she could see the steps on the stairs." (Tr. 104,
Ab. 34.)
The appellant testified that she came out of her
room and across the hall to the head of the stairs as
follows: "I put my hand on the post and went to take
a step and the next thing I was rolling, the lights went
out and everything was befuddled and everything went
dark, and I found myself rolling (Tr. 91, Ab. 29) and (Tr.
104, Ab. 34) she said she saw the first step but she
doesn't know whether she stepped on the step or not.
The question then arises as to the proximate cause
of the fall.
In view of her testimony to the effect that she
placed her hand on the post and saw the first step, it
is obvious that the alleged lack of artificial light was in
no wise the proximate cause of her fall, on the contrary
the fact of her illness coupled with her confusion as to
the cause of her fall, the fact that she was befuddled and
everything went dark (italics supplied) can lead to
but one conclusion, that her illness caused the fall or
was the proximate cause of the fall. The court, therefore,
did properly grant the motion for a non-suit on the
ground that the appellant failed in her burden to prove
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any causal connection between the injuries suffered and
the alleged negligence on the part of the respondent.

PROPOSITION NlT~fBER THREE:
The appellant was guilty of contributory negligence .
.\ person ,\-ho goes down and across a hotel hall
and starts down the stairs ,\-ithout stopping and looking
to see if the stairs are lighted or are dark and as a result
falls and is injured is guilty of contributory negligence as
a matter of law.
The testimony of the appellant herself on cross
examination coupled with the physical facts, clearly
establishes the fact that she was guilty of contributory
negligence. In this connection, the courfs attention is
called to her testimony which was as follows:
She does not remember whether or not she could
see the steps on the stairs. (Tr. 102, Ah. 34) She could
not tell if she missed a step or not. (Tr. 104, Ab. 34) She
had no recollection at all as to the second step because
she did not stop and. look as she started down the stairs.
(Tr. 105, 106, Ah. 35.) As shown from her testimony we
quote from the transcript page 105-106, Ah. 35:

Q.

Do you recall looking to see whether there
was any light at the bottom of the stairs as
you started down?

A.

I didn't have time to look.
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Q.

You stood there, didn't you?

A.

I didn't stop, I placed my hand on the post
and started to take the first step, and the
lights went out.

Q.

You didn't stop to see if there was any light
coming up from the bottom of the stairs.
xxx(Argument of Counsel)

Q.

Your recollection is, as I understand it now,
is you do not recall ever having looked on
this particular morning to see if there was
any light coming up from the bottom of the
stairway. (no answer.)

Q.

Do you understand the question?

A.

Yes, I know I didn't look.

Q.

You know you didn't look?

A.

No sir.

Q.

This is your recollection, that you did not
look?

A.

There was a light when I started and so I
went out and all of a sudden the light went
out and I did not have any time to look.

Q.

Do you want the court and the jury to believe you came in a hurry out of this room
and passed through that hall and put you
hand on the post without stopping to look?

A.

Why shouldn't I?

(Tr. 10?, Ab. 35) she testified:
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Q.

You didn·t stop "·hen you arrived at the
top of the stairway did you?

A.

No sir.

She testified (Tr. 108•.-\h. 36) that she saw the first
step. and (Tr. 116..-\b. 39) she says that it was so dark
she could not see the step, and (Tr. 109, Ab. 36) she says
she kept her eyes on her foot. but she testified (Tr. 106,
Ah. 35) that she did not look do"Tn the stairs.
With the above review of evidence we submit that
the plaintiff's testimony which can he no stronger than
it is left on cross-examination, (Edwards vs. Clark, 96
Ut. 121; 83 Pac. (2d) 1021) shows that she was guilty of
contributory negligence as a matter of law. The case of
DeHoney vs. Harding reported in 300 Fed. 696, is in
point. The plaintiff was a guest in the defendant's hotel
assigned to a second story room. The accident occurred
at eight o'clock in the morning when it was full daylight.
The plaintiff left her room in a diagonal course, crossed
the carpet runner and stepped of into a descending stairway, fell and received the injuries of which she complains. The descending stairway was shut off by a door
at the lower end and therefore it was dark. The plaintiff had passed the descending stairs on numerous oc..
casions and was acquainted with the surroundings. At
the close of the evidence the defendant moved for a directed verdict upon the grounds that th,e evidence failed
to establish negligence on the part of the defendant and
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affirmatively showed that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. The motion was sustained, judgment entered for the defendant, and from that judgment
the case was appealed, and was affirmed. The court in
its opinion sets up the duties of an innkeeper towards
his guests and gives an excellent definition of what is
contributory negligence. On page ?'00 of the report the
court holds as follows:
"It appears from the evidence that the plaintiff, without any regard for her own safety, deliberately stepped from the lighted corridor into a
darkened stairway, when, if she had used her
eyes, she would have seen the stairway and
avoided the accident. If she had left her room
with her eyes closed, walked across the corridor,
and stepped off into the stairway, no one would
seriously contend that she was not guilty of negligence which contributed to her injury. Her own
testimony shows she practically did this thing. It
seems clear that plaintiff simply hurried out of
her room, and, without paying any attention to
where she was going and without using her senses,
walked into this darkened stairway. We cannot
escape the conclusion that plaintiff, as a matter of
law, was guilty of negligence which contributed
to the proximate cause of the injuries for which
she seeks recovery. Zvanovich vs. Gagnon & Co.,
45 Mont. 180, 122 Pac. 2?'2; Stanwood v. Clancy,
106 Me. 72, 75 Atl. 293; 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1213;
Massey v. Seller et al., 45 Or. 26?, ?'? Pac. 397~
Johnson v. Ramberg, 49 Minn. 341, 51 N. W. 1043;
Larned v. Vanderlinde, 165 Mich. 464, 131 N. W.
165; Sparks v. Siebrecht et al, 19 App. Div. 11?,
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45 .\. Y. ~upp. 991. Of cout·se if the defendant
,,~as not guilty of actionable neglig·t'nee. plaintiffs negligence ,,~ns not strictly speaking, contributory neglig:enee. but in either event the lower
court propertly directed a verdict and the result
is the same.

"·The judgment is affirmed.··
Other cases supporting the contention of the respondent
in this respect are:
Cook Ys. McGillicuddy. (Main) 75 At. 378.
Illinois Central Railroad Co. vs. Sanderson, 192
s. w. 869.

F. W. "-oolworth Co. vs. Davis, 41 Fed. (2d) 342.

'T

Johnson et al vs.
ashington Route Incorporated,
209 Pac. 1100.
Hendricks vs. Jones, (Ga.) 111 S. E. 81.
Dempsey vs. Horton et al. (Mo.) 84 S. W. (2d) 621,
page 625.
~Iedcraft

vs. ~1erchants Exchange, S. F. 211 Cal.
404, 295 Pac. 822.

Sullivan vs. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. (Mont.) 94 Pac.
(2d) 651.
Craft vs. Fordson Coal Co. (W. V.) 171 S. E. 886.
Curtis vs. Capital Stage Line (Mo.) 27 S. W. (2d)
747.
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McVeagh vs. Bass, 110 Penn. Super. 379, 171 Atl.
486.
New York Tel. Co. vs. Beckers et al, 30 Fed. (2d)
5?8.
Blankertz vs. Mack & Co. et al, (Mich.) 248 N. W.
889.
Rice vs. Goodspeed Real Estate Co., 254 Michigan
49; 235 N. W. 814.
We submit, therefore, that in light of the evidence
and the law as above set forth, the appellant was guilty
of contributory negligence as a matter of law, and therefore, the court was obliged to grant the respondent's
motion for a non-suit.
Thompson on Trials-Vol 2, 2nd Edition, Sec. 1680,
Page 1262:
"Where an unavoidable inference of contributory negligence arises out of plaintiff's own
evidence, or out of evidence which stands undisputed in the case, the plaintiff must be either
non-suited, xxx If, however, it appears without
any conflict of evidence from plaintiff's own
case, or from cross-examination of his witness that
he was guilty of contributory negligence approximately contributing to produce the injury, it
would be the duty of the Court to take the case
from the jury, by declaring as a matter of law,
that the plaintiff cannot recover."
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We respectfully submit therefore that the judgment
should he sustained.

H. D. LOWRY.
CLA.RENCE c·. NESLEN.
Attorneys for Respondent
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